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Abstract This article is about caregivers being attentive
to patients in healthcare. From earlier work on the under-
standing of the other, we know that it is impossible to
completely understand the experiences of others. By the
sharing of subjectivity—intersubjectivity—we may try to
‘grasp’ the other’s point of view. However, we can never
assume that the same experience produces the same expe-
rience. Now, if it is principally impossible to understand
the experience of one another, and if paying attention
always implies an understanding of what to pay attention
to, then how is it possible to be attentive to the experiences
of those who are entirely at the mercy of our care? How
can caregivers perceive the impossibility of understanding
the experiences of patients as an appeal to be attentive to
their experiences? This is discussed in this article. It
departs from the authors being confronted with inexplica-
bilities in the empirical study of attentiveness in healthcare.
It presents two examples and discusses the meaning of
these emergent properties. This leads to a discussion of the
existent literature on the indefiniteness and openness of
attentiveness. It becomes clear why, although we can
understand and predict much of it, attentiveness will
always be characterized by a certain uncontrollability as
well.
Keywords Attentiveness  Emergence  Indefiniteness 
Ethics of care
Introduction
Paying attention is a process of directed observation of the
environment. It has different characteristics, but it always
involves observation, or perception, and interpretation
(Arvidson 2006). If you are paying attention to something,
you take something as something. For example, you see
something circular as a ball. Or as a balloon. Or as the belly
of your pregnant friend. What you perceive is not fixed, but
it is meaningful and thus an interpretation of what occurs.
Your attention to the balloon is associated with under-
standing that what you see is a balloon. What you feel does
also play a role in attentiveness. Your attention to your
pregnant friend’s belly, for instance, is associated with
your joy about the fact that she is expecting a child.
This also applies to care. For example, your attention
may be drawn to a patient who is crying. However, you do
not know what that crying means. Maybe you can find it
out by asking, but that is not always possible, due to the
circumstances or because the patient does not tell you what
the matter is. Then what? In practice, this often means that
the caregiver’s attentiveness moves away and focuses on
something he can do something about or something he can
understand instead (Klaver and Baart 2016).
We, caregivers, have to understand patients. Interest in the
patient’s experience is growing in all facets of health care,
which is shown by the increasing number of health care
institutions making ‘patient experience’ a strategic goal,
insurance companies that want to gain insight in the quality
of the patient experience to rely their policy on, the
increasing amount of ‘lifeworld studies’, and so on. In the
healthcare sector, mainly dominated by the medical profes-
sion, it becomes more and more clear that we not only need to
understand about diseases, but also about the people who
suffer them. The notion of ‘patient-centeredness’ has
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increasingly influenced healthcare in the Netherlands and
elsewhere. Patient experience has been given high priority.
In the midst of consumer driven concerns, the aim has been to
give patients more ‘voice and choice’ in their own health care
(Berwick 2009).
Patient experiences have not always been a central value
in the health care practice, since caregivers must pursue
other values, such as strictly working according to proto-
cols, finishing tasks in time, meeting production standards,
or showing in a good light amongst colleagues. The
experiences of patients are often moved to the background.
Therefore, every patient’s story, every study or other
attempt to come closer to the experience of a sick person, is
a major victory. However, since there are as many stories
as there are people, the experience of one patient never
speaks for another one. Patient experiences have to do
something impossible, but something that is impossible to
ignore as well: they must speak on behalf of others whose
experience we do not know.
In fact, generally speaking, it is impossible to under-
stand the experience of a patient. When trying to ‘grasp’
the patient’s point of view, sharing experiences with them
seems the most appropriate approach. The sharing of sub-
jectivity—intersubjectivity—creates moments of recogni-
tion and the intuition that we have ‘grasped’ the other’s
point of view. At the same time, however, we can never
assume that the same experience produces the same expe-
rience (Van der Geest 2007: 9; our italics). This refers to
the problem of identification (Gadamer in Fay 1996: 8–50).
Gadamer would say it is essential for the understanding of
an experience that the observer must be able to identify
with the experience. He needs to understand it as a par-
ticular experience and assess it like that. The observer
should be able to identify the experience; this identification
makes it an experience. Another essential aspect of
understanding an experience is that the identity of that
experience can be understood only if the observer ‘plays
along’. According to Gadamer, the real understanding of an
experience can only be achieved if there is an active atti-
tude that establishes a meaning. This makes the observer a
fellow actor in the experience. An experience supposedly
consists of two aspects: the experience itself and the
observer who plays along in the game of the experience.
This makes it intrinsically impossible to understand the
experience of the other in the same way as the other does.
Now, if it is principally impossible to understand the
experience of one another, and if paying attention always
implies understanding, then how is it possible to be attentive
to the experiences of those who are dependent on our care?
How can caregivers perceive the impossibility of under-
standing the experiences of patients as an appeal to be
attentive to their experiences? This is discussed in this article.
Two propositions
As this paper is about care and attentiveness, it must be
clear what our view of care involves. In this view of care,
attentiveness is a core issue. Our approach includes two
main assumptions. These assumptions are common in care
ethics, the theoretical approach in which our thinking is
placed. The first premise is that care takes place in rela-
tionships. Persons, communities, and organizations are
conceptualized as relational and interdependent (Held
2006; Van Heijst 2011).
The second premise is that care is always context-bound
and situation-specific (Tronto 1993). One can discern three
forms of context: the physical context such as the place
where you live, the social context that assumes that
everyone is in a relational network, and the historical
context that takes into account someone’s biography
(Klaver et al. 2014).
Background of the problem: inexplicabilities
in the study of attentiveness in health care
Because attention is an essential element in good care and
at the same time lacks a single definition, we conducted a
qualitative empirical research. This study yielded a
grounded model that describes different types of atten-
tiveness and explains its occurrence (Klaver and Baart
2016). The analysis showed that a descriptive model of
attentiveness comprises a coherent set of the clusters per-
ception (A), object finding (B), and space for attentiveness
(C). Our data show nine types of attentiveness. We
answered the question why a caregiver practices one type
of attentiveness in a certain situation, and not another type.
First, it appeared to be of crucial importance whether
attentiveness is essential for giving care in the opinion of
the caregiver. Second, the focus of attention is essential.
Care given by doctors and nurses is always ambivalent; on
the one hand, it concerns the body, and on the other hand, it
involves the person whom that body belongs to (ibid.).
During our empirical research, we have also found that,
at the same time, attentiveness always seems to escape the
analysis partly. Although we can identify what factors are
of influence, there is still something in the emergence and
the nimbleness of attentiveness which we cannot grasp.
These inexplicabilities coming forward in the analysis, is
the reason for this paper.
In the analysis we have described different types of
attentiveness and we have seen how these emerged. We
have looked at complete cases, i.e. from the emergence of
attentiveness to its outcome for the patient. This means
that, in the analysis of the empirical data, the effect of the
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attentiveness is included in the nomination and description
of an attention type. We have described the various factors
that have affected the outcome. Yet this is not a process of
cause and effect which can be applied reversely as well.
We found that even if the influencing factors are the same,
another type of attentiveness with another result may
emerge. Even though we had a good view of the variables
and we could quite well understand why a certain kind of
attention had occurred, it appeared that the type of atten-
tiveness was not entirely predictable. The explanation of
attentiveness was deficient.
For example, the circumstances may be structured in such
a way that based on what we have learnt about attentiveness,
the attention is expected to be very brief and focused, and
nevertheless, the caregiver may suddenly perform atten-
tiveness of an open kind. Apparently, the caregiver did
experience the need and space to be attentive in an open way,
while this was not the case in similar situations.
From the analysis of our empirical data, it became clear
that the occurrence of attentiveness is always associated
with something unpredictable and not exhausted by the
empirically shown mechanisms. This was the starting point
of this paper. In the literature, we found that these unpre-
dictable aspects are described as the result of emergence.
Emergent properties (Johnson 2006; Sawyer 2003; Rehder
2003) can be thought of as unexpected, unaccountable, and
untraceable behaviours that stem from interaction between
the components of a phenomenon and their environment. It
seemed that, although attentiveness can be understood to a
large extent, there is always a moment that escapes the
prediction. Many factors can be explained but at the same
time attentiveness will always be characterised by a certain
uncontrollable aspect. This paper departs from the finding
that attentiveness has to do with a layered causality, and it
will show that this implies that a certain irreducibility and
unpredictability are to be included in the analysis.
Emergence on the level of the caregiver
Emergent properties are explained above as unavoidable
elements in the complex practices of attentiveness. In this
section, we will extend this idea and propose that this
inexplicable nature is not only an unavoidable element but
also an indispensable ingredient of good attentiveness—
and therefore, there should be space for it in healthcare.
As we have shown, when analysing the data, we as
researchers knew what the effect of the attentiveness had
been, and therefore we gave a certain type of attentiveness
a certain name. Thus, the effect of attentiveness is included
in the understanding of the type occurred. However, the
caregiver does not know in advance which type of atten-
tiveness is going to appear.1
In the cases of the more ‘open’ types of attentiveness,
when the attentiveness is not (yet) or not exclusively
focused on one object, the caregiver often makes a guess
and they do something which is not directly deducible to a
concrete goal, or they refer to something they cannot quite
predict or control. This is what we call emergence on the
level of the caregiver. We will illustrate this by means of
examples. We present two case descriptions from our
study, and then explain that emergent properties seem to be
at work.
The first example is about a physician-assistant who has
a very stressful day. As his colleague is ill, he must visit
patients on other wards and also help out in the emergency
department. In the afternoon, he does his round on his own
ward. A visit to this patient was not planned, but a nurse
asks the doctor to. The patient is a man with cancer in an
advanced stage who has trouble eating. He is sitting on his
bed in T-shirt and underpants. There are flowers on his
bedside table and children’s drawings on the wall. The man
has a frolic, round face and a big belly. He is worried about
not eating well. ‘‘I used to be a gourmand, as they call it.
But there is little gourmand left’’, the patient says. The
doctor replies: ‘‘Do you mean you are throwing up all the
time, or that nothing tastes good to you anymore?’’ What
follows is a discussion about optimizing the situation under
all circumstances. It covers the patient’s perception of the
situation. The doctor is aware of the medical problems that
have to do with eating, but he also has an eye for the wider,
existential experience of the patient. By listening to the
utterance of the patient, to the words he chooses, and by not
only asking for the things relevant to the medical treatment,
he leaves room for the perspective of the patient’s expe-
rience to open up. Eventually, the case turns out not to be
about having problems with eating food, but about being
less able to enjoy life.
Another example is about a lady who has recovered
from cancer and now visits the oncologist twice a year for a
check-up. She is a rather opinionated woman who takes
little note of the advice of the doctor. She also laughs at her
husband who is trying to influence her health behaviour
through the oncologist. What we see is that the woman is
playing with the doctor. She lies and cheats, and does not
listen to him. In a sense, the patient exerts force on the
doctor. However, the doctor continues to receive and see
her. He plays along with her and listens to her little lies.
Eventually, it all turns out to be about faith and loyalty.
The attentiveness that has occurred in the above cases, is
of two different types. In the first case, the attentiveness is
1 However, sometimes it seems to be like that: e.g. when a caregiver
aims to ‘give some attention’. But this is not what we mean. We do
not necessarily understand the meaning of attentiveness in the same
way as caregivers do.
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relational, which means that there is no preset goal, but
what is at stake for the patient emerges in the conversation
and the doctor responds accordingly. This is remarkable
because the doctor is very busy and actually had other
plans. The question he asks is in line with his stressful day:
not quite open; however, it works out well. Our data show
that in similar cases, there usually occurs at most a very
focused, framed attention. In the second case, the atten-
tiveness ‘condones’. The doctor allows the patient to play
with him a little. In retrospect, it appears that space has
arisen for what is currently the most important for the
patient, namely that she does the most necessary in order to
stay healthy, and that she visits the oncologist for her semi-
annual checkups.
In both cases, a different kind of attentiveness rises than
we would expect based on the grounded theory (Klaver and
Baart 2016). As described earlier, the emergence of a
certain type of attention is more than the sum of its parts.
There will always be unpredictable parts, both for the
caregiver and the researcher. These emergent properties
originate from the interaction of the caregiver and the
patient. In the relationship between them, things can come
into existence that cannot be reduced to just either of them
(Klaver and Baart 2011). Secondly, the environment
affects what may emerge as well (ibid.). In this study, the
field (locus) of the emergence is the caregiver. Properties
that could not be predicted may arise from their interaction
with the patient and the contextual factors.
Based on the data, we can distinguish between emer-
gence on the level of perception and emergence on the
level of social interactions.2 The first stems from the
operation of consciousness, perceptions, intentionality,
reviews, moral sensitivity, etc. while the second is asso-
ciated with work culture, the functioning of the team, the
patient’s assertiveness, the structure of the business aspects
of the care, the course of the day (visits on the ward,
outpatient, who was before you, etc.), and so on. All these
forces come together in the caregiver, and although we can
quite predict which attentiveness will occur from that, it
fundamentally escapes our understanding which seems to
be based on ‘producing’ attentiveness.
The idea of an existence of inexplicabilities is consistent
with the care ethical assumptions that good care is always
relational, context-bound, and therefore unique. From the
interaction among people and between them and the
environment, things may become visible that previously
were not. This requires some openness in the attentiveness
of the caregiver. By having open attention, i.e. attention
that is not completely framed but receptive to what may
emerge, a relationship may be created that is wider than
just functional, allowing what really matters to pop up.
In current discussions on healthcare that must be
attentive to patients, the emphasis is on understanding
patients by obtaining as much insight into their experiences
as possible (Department of Health report 2010). Conse-
quently, more and more studies focus on patient experience
and lifeworlds. However, the working of emergent prop-
erties shows that this is not enough. On the one hand,
caregivers gain understanding by information on patient
experiences. These can make them more sensitive to the
various experiences of the patients they encounter. On the
other hand, we also have to realize that health care pro-
fessionals should not want to understand everything.
Understanding also means defining or settling, and this is
too static a meaning to be attentive to patients. Attentive-
ness should not only consist of your own active inquiry, but
also by ‘receptiveness’ or the mode of ‘letting things
happen’.
The emergent properties make clear that good care
depends on the recognition of the indefinite. We see that
attentiveness is often focused on an object, but for good
care it is essential that attentiveness is open to a certain
degree. Therefore, openness, or indeterminacy, should have
a place in our thinking about care. Perhaps we must
abandon the idea that attentiveness must always be focused
on something. But how can someone be attentive without
knowing what to focus on?
Attentiveness: the indefinite as essential
In the care relationship, due to the attention, something
may come into existence that is often absent or invisible
beforehand. We have illustrated this with some examples.
It becomes clear that being an attentive caregiver is not
always about trying to determine the object of attention, i.e.
attribute a fixed meaning, but rather to postpone the
interpretation, or to continue interpreting. Interpreting is
understood here as a process, something that is not static,
but moving. Gadamer (1997) describes an ever expanding
circle of understanding and interpretation in which we
approach a topic with some preconceptions, or projections.
These projections are then examined and revised in the face
of what ‘‘the things themselves’’ reveal to us. Then we
return to a further exploration in the light of this new
understanding. In addition, the topic is understood by
viewing ‘‘the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in
terms of the whole’’ (p. 291). This dynamic movement of
understanding from projection to topic to new projection,
and from whole to part to whole, constitutes the
hermeneutic circle of understanding and interpretation.
2 The existing literature on emergence makes a distinction between
strong and weak emergence (Chalmers 2001; Bedau 1997).
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Open attention should not only be described as actively
searching. It is also a kind of waiting; a process of learning;
a process of letting something come to you. This section
discusses some authors commenting on this indefiniteness
or openness.
Iris Murdoch, philosopher and novelist, shows in her
essays from the 50s and 60s how morality is a matter of
open attentiveness. For Murdoch ‘looking’, as an ‘action
of attentiveness’, is a metaphor for ‘seeing’: forming a
picture of the other as he really is. She illustrates this by
means of a story about a mother who is not happy with her
daughter-in-law, as she thinks her unpolished behaviour is
not good enough for her son. However, out of courtesy,
she does not show it. Consequently, because the mother
does not turn away from the daughter, she does not stick
with the rejection. As she continues to look at the
daughter-in-law and tries to see through her unpolished
behaviour, she focuses her gaze on just that part which is
so difficult to see, and thus she ‘looks for the best in her’.
She tries to see the daughter-in-law not ‘accurate’ in the
sense of logically correct, but she tries to see her ‘right’, to
do her justice. The mother is not trying to understand what
she sees; she only needs to see it ‘clear’. According to
Murdoch, this seeing clearly unfolds in a process of
looking: in a process of ‘careful and just attention’ (1997).
In this process, she is going to see other things: other
conduct than the unpolished behaviour. It is a kind of
looking that starts from the good in the daughter-in-law.
As the mother is guided by the good, even though she only
sees unpolished behaviour on the surface, she does the
daughter-in-law justice.
Murdoch makes a distinction between seeing and
understanding, or ‘‘seeing clearly’’ versus being logical and
correct. This difference is also cited by Baart (2004: 55)
when he writes about the Greek word ‘‘diagnoses’’. In this
kind of compound words, ‘‘dia’’ usually means something
like ‘‘going through something.’’ ‘‘Gnos’’ can be translated
as to know or understand. Diagnostics is the doctrine of
seeing through: understanding through the things. This
means not to stop at the phenomena as they appear, but
look through them, with the assumption that behind or
beneath the deceptive appearance, the true reality of a
phenomenon lies: its essence.
Simone Weil says: ‘it is not important to understand new
things, but to learn to fathom, with patience, effort and
method, obvious truths with your whole being’ (1949:
223). Just like Baart, with this ‘‘fathoming’’ she refers to a
deeper layer. Weil considers thinking—she calls it study-
ing—as gymnastics for the attentiveness, but no more than
that, because ultimately attentiveness is about something
else. It is, according to Weil, about distinguishing between
reality and illusion. The aforementioned ‘‘looking’’ is
indeed a way to exercise the mind, but it is also about
looking without attachment. For Weil, attentiveness is the
‘suspension of the thought and the experience and allow-
ance of the emptiness’ (1949: 229). According to Weil,
attentiveness is not a result of the will (i.e. the mode of
producing’), but of a desire (i.e. the mode of ‘waiting’).
This is an important nuance: attentiveness comes down to
really desiring, but not to trying to accomplish it. To Weil,
it is about an attentiveness that is so concentrated that the
‘‘I’’ does play no role. In the words of Murdoch attention is
an imaginative and normative use of moral vision that
burns away the selfishness of natural human desire, leaving
behind the purified desire or just and compassionate love
(1970).
Attentiveness that creates
According to Murdoch and Weil, open attentiveness is
about a way of seeing that ‘imagines’ love. Weil argues
that when attentiveness is intense enough, it coincides with
the ability of a human to ‘‘create’’. This creation is relevant
from the perspective of care, as care is about getting to ‘the
good’ in the relationship between caregiver and patient. It
is not always clear what is good for a particular patient in a
particular situation. However, this may crystallize in the
relationship. The caregiver’s open attentiveness can help
giving shape to this good: slowly it can be imaged who he
can be for the patient and what his attention should focus
on.
Waldenfels (2004) also refers to this creating atten-
tiveness. He states that attentiveness consists of certain
types of actions and accidents (‘being given’) that must be
created. These types of experiences do not exist in the
world of physical things and processes, nor in the inner
world of mental acts. They must be ‘‘created’’ by ‘‘deter-
mining what is undetermined’’. Instead of intentionality
joining ‘‘us’’ with ‘‘the world’’ (as per Merleau-Ponty’s
phrasing), Waldenfels describes a responsivity that exists
between the ‘‘order’’ on the one hand and the ‘‘alien’’ on
the other. Correspondingly, his focus is on boundaries,
borders and limits: on thresholds of attention, on the twi-
light of order, on the human as a ‘‘liminal being’’ (2011,
pp. 8–20), and significantly, on the dia, the ‘‘between
words’’, as contained in the word dialog (ibid.). This
applies to the doctor in the first example above: not only
does he hear the words spoken by the patient, but he is also
attentive to what is said ‘‘between the lines’’.
Husserl also emphasizes this indefiniteness or vagueness
‘‘in between’’. Creative perception means seeing and
hearing something new by seeing and hearing in a new
way. […] Creative attention refers to a special dimension
of experience that we characterize as pathique and re-
sponsive (Husserl in Waldenfels 2004). This means no
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experience can exist without somebody to whom it hap-
pens, whether it may be a case of pleasure, of pain, of joy
or of sorrow. Vice versa there is no response without
something to which or somebody to whom it responds.
‘What takes place here on a deeper level precedes and
exceeds every sort of sense and rule; it goes beyond
intentionality and regularity. Whatever strikes or affects us
does not possess any sense or follow any rule in advance, it
only obtains a certain sense and a certain regularity by the
creativity of our answers’ (ibid). Husserl does not see
creation as something like a pure creation which would
transfer us straight into a world of imagination. On the
contrary, ‘creative responses transform and deform given
forms in a way similar to how the Revival re-created the
imagery of Greek-Roman antiquity’ (ibid.).
To open up this deeper dimension, Waldenfels argues
we need a special kind of responsive attentiveness that
interrupts the progress of the natural experience and gives
up what we take for granted. This does not lead us to what
our experience means, but rather to what our experience is
responding to. This applies to the doctor in the second
example above. In letting the patient play with him a little,
and in not being able to explain what he is doing and for
what reason, he leads us to what his experience is
responding to.
Merleau-Ponty (1945) writes about attentiveness as a
transformative act. According to Merleau-Ponty, atten-
tiveness can bring about a transformation of the mental
field by adhering to turning points. Unlike a single mention
of anything due to the importance of the subject, or the
surprising nature of the object, Merleau-Ponty understands
attentiveness as a new way of being present to things.
Attentiveness is a transformation on the way it is aware of
something. ‘In attention, consciousness can become atten-
tive and attend to being-in-the-world, to the presence of the
world and not merely to the present world at hand’ (Sa´
Cavalcante Schuback 2006: 138). This transformative
attentiveness then points at a rediscovery of things.
Verhoeven calls this ‘wondering’. Rather than under-
standing this as something unexpected coming to us that
we had never experienced that way before, he claims that
wonder creates a transformation in which the previously
experienced things can be seen in a new light. Attentive-
ness in the meaning of ‘wonder’ is a respite from ingrained
patterns of perceiving, naming, thinking, and acting.
Attentiveness therefore means a transformation in percep-
tion and knowledge.
In his book on the art of hunting, the Spanish philoso-
pher Ortega y Gasset creates a type of phenomenology he
calls the hunter’s attention. He describes hunting as letting
go of a focus. A hunter is someone who has learnt how to
wait. The hunter has learnt to expect the unexpectable. This
vision resembles Simone Weil’s: the hunter’s attention is
not connected to anything that’s already there either, nor is
it the ability to respond quickly to surprising occurrences.
For the hunter, attentiveness is related to the open inde-
terminacy of imminent events (Ortega y Gasset 1960). That
openness is odd, because openness can only catch our
attention when we divert our attention from the indicated
objects. It is precisely at the moments when attention
focused on fixed points is interrupted that open attention
has a chance to break through.
In sum, attentiveness is neither a collage of outer
mechanisms and internal acts, nor a scale leading gradually
from passivity to activity. On the contrary, it is carried on
by a radical kind of passivity. This sort of passivity proves
to be more than the mere counterpart of our own activity
and more than a diminished degree of activity. Responding
means to start from elsewhere, from what is alien to us.
While responding to the other’s appeal we step outside
ourselves.
Attentiveness and mindfulness
This sort of passivity is cultivated in the Buddhism-ori-
ented movement of Mindfulness. Mindfulness recognizes
the double event of attention (being affected by and
responding to) and can be described as a non-judgmental
presence in the here and now. It is used both in a psy-
chotherapeutic context (e.g. in the treatment of anxiety and
stress), and in a more ideological context (meditation
inspired by Buddhism). Mindfulness has also been descri-
bed as an art of living marked by an aversion to the hasty
life. These forms of mindfulness are particularly aimed at
the ego, the self and therefore their relevance for hospital
care mainly lies in self-care. Research has not clarified
whether practising mindfulness leads to, for instance, more
open attention for care recipients or to paying more
attention when carrying out certain tasks. This could still
be the case, because practising mindfulness can result in
concentration, which in turn will result in insights (Hanh
2009). When it comes to mindfulness, two forms of con-
centration can be distinguished: the active form and the
selective form. The active concentration exists in the here
and now and is open to anything that presents itself. When
selective concentration is practiced, the attention is per-
sistently focused on one object of choice. This concentra-
tion creates an intense type of presence, which results in
stability and calmness. The higher the level of meditative
concentration, the more insights are achieved. Another
important aspect of mindfulness is attentiveness. This can
be focused on our bodies, our feelings, our minds, and the
object of our minds. Just like concentration, the attentive-
ness is focused on the present moment, enabling us to make
contact with things or other people. This leads not only to
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understanding, but also to new perspectives and transfor-
mation (ibid). Themes of a similar nature can be found in
Benedictine spirituality (Casey 2005; Gru¨n 2006; Derkse
2003). Both mindfulness and these Christianity-oriented
ideas on living in attention are about permanently prac-
tising ‘the respectful receptivity of the infinite other’ (Baart
2008: 9).
Attentiveness and unknowing
When it comes to care, the point of the double character of
attentiveness is that the caregiver, despite his lack of
understanding, does not turn the gaze away but keeps
watching. Attentiveness as described above is open and, to
a greater or lesser extent, searches for an understanding of
what the proper focus must be. It is both active and passive.
Some forms of open attention do not even seem to pursue
any understanding at all but advocate a kind of ‘‘un-
knowing’’:
Knowing is wonderful, but it is just a guiding means.
Unknowing is a condition of openness. This
unknowing in the intersubjective space of two people
or people of two cultures allows others to be. This art
of unknowing may enable a nurse to understand, with
empathy, the actual essence of the meaning an
experience has for a patient. This pattern of
unknowing focused herein on the intersubjective
whole between patient and nurse is applicable as well
to learning in a more formal sense. To be open to
learning one needs to posture oneself in a position of
unknowing to hear a colleague, a teacher, a student.
To provide and find openness is to be able to say, ‘‘I
never thought about it that way,’’ and at once expe-
rience the wonderment of coming upon an ‘‘un-
known’’ (Munhall 1993: 125).
Open attentiveness means a certain unknowing, a kind of
swinging with what happens and a loosening of the reins,
with the assumption that the unseen will show. This seems
to be against the rules of medicine, in which everything
must be monitored and controlled. In some situations
however, good care requires unknowing attentiveness that
is not focused on results or goals.
As stated before, we cannot always fully understand
patients. In practice, not understanding often means that
caregivers direct their attention toward something else,
something they are able to place. However, the above lit-
erature shows that attentiveness is not necessarily con-
nected to grasping the other’s point of view. We do not
have to understand patients in order to be attentive to them.
Like patients, no experience is the same. Describing an
experience is difficult. Once we give words to the experience,
we have to deal with an inevitable loss of meaning: ‘‘When
you say the word flower, you have already lost the bouquet,’’
the poet Mallarme´ writes. Words like to stick, and do not allow
escape. Rational, descriptive knowledge describe reality so
much that there are also aspects that escape this described
reality; there is too much firmly fixed to allow for a more
comprehensive meaning (Bos 2011).
It seems to go against the current organization of health
care, since everything needs to be determined precisely, but
good care cannot do without indeterminacy. We should not
just focus on the patient experience, we should also realize
that we cannot grasp it fully, and create a kind of reser-
vation. At the same time, this reservation should have a
place in our thinking and evaluating of the quality of care,
and should not be stashed away.
Discussion
How can caregivers be attentive to patients despite of the
impossibility of fully grasping their experiences? This
paper elaborated on attentiveness, and discussed the
meaning of attentiveness defined as totally determined by
an empirically made transparent, causal mechanism. It
concluded that attentiveness can also be undetermined,
unfixed, or pending.
Much has been written about patient-centredness,
patient experiences, patient lifeworld, and so on. The claim
is that these kinds of research may help caregivers
becoming more sensitive to what is at stake for patients, by
taking up an emic point of view. Of course, this is a very
good idea. But there is also something else going on, which
partly contradicts that: it is impossible for caregivers to
fully understand patients. When it comes to attentiveness in
health care, we need to thematize this impossibility as well:
the emptiness, the lack of understanding.
Strikingly, Blanchot (1997) writes that some experi-
ences ask for ‘‘inattentiveness’’—negligence and absent-
mindedness—rather than attentiveness. His concern is a
special kind of inattentiveness. Not an insensitivity that
only betrays contempt, because such insensitivity might
just be about an ‘‘I’’, who imagines he is the centre of the
universe. The inattentiveness Blanchot writes about is more
passive, less calculating, and less aggressive. In this care-
lessness it is not the ‘‘I’’ that is key. On the contrary, the
‘‘I’’ is exposed to a passion for the passive, for not-doing,
for negligence. This passion for the passive is characterized
by the fact that, as Blanchot puts it, the eyes remain open
without them seeing (‘les yeux ouverts sans regard’). The
‘‘I’’ disappears. There is no one who wants to grasp the
world anymore.
We think the literature that presents patient experi-
ences and thereby claims to provide insight or
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understanding, partially falls prey to the problem that is
precisely identified by the authors. The more we try to
get a grip on the experiences of patients by translating it
into ‘knowledge about patients’, the more it will actually
escape our understanding. If we want to do justice to the
experience of (sick) people, to their unique experiences,
we might have to focus on the impossibility of grasping
the other’s point of view, rather than on the urge for
understanding.
The growing interest in research into the experience of
patients is not the same as being attentive to patients, as
long as the research is seen as a tool to be more attentive
to patients in health care. Attentiveness is not something
we have, and not something we can shape arbitrarily.
Attentiveness has us and shapes us. We can often direct
our attention, but it will always be characterised by a
certain level of uncontrollability as well. Our attention
surpasses our own projects, just as it surpasses the various
techniques and practices by which our attentive behaviour
is modelled.
Conclusion
Does the current constant urge to understand the experi-
ences of patients threaten the attentiveness to patients? This
paper tries to make credible that it is not the question
whether patients will still be seen in the future. There is no
reason to fear that attentiveness will disappear. There is
rather a danger that the desire to ‘‘make’’ attentiveness, will
cause attentiveness to be understood as combating igno-
rance. As health care professionals, we must not attempt to
understand patients fully. Conversely, understanding is
being attentive to what comes into existence because of the
fostering attentiveness; to what shows itself to the extent
that attentiveness seeks the mode of ‘letting things happen’
(receptivity), and is not imposing functionality but
respecting otherness. Only in this meaning, we avoid that
out of the fear of being confronted with a lack of under-
standing, we as caregivers fill gaps with our own impres-
sions and thereby take the position of the patient.
‘Reflecting on our own experience to understand the other
is balancing between ‘‘ego-centrist’’ non-understanding
and empathetic understanding of the other in terms of
ourselves’ (Van der Geest 2007: 9). We all carry the
experiences of being sick, of uncertainty and dependency,
with us in our bodies, in our family ties, in our culture, and
in our language. It is in those places where we experience
an understanding of what cannot be understood. The desire
to be attentive to others will report itself from those places.
But only if we can leave room for it, and if we do not fill
this space with well-defined views about what should be
understood, and for what sense and benefit.
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